Miscarriages of JusticeUK (MOJUK)
22 Berners St, Birmingham B19 2DR
Tele: 0121- 507 0844 Email: mojuk@mojuk.org.uk Web: www.mojuk.org.uk

MOJUK: Newsletter 'Inside Out' No 680 (22/03/2018) - Cost £1

Farid Hilali Seeks €1.8m Compensation For Wrongful Jailing Over 9/11

James Badcock, Guardian: A man seeking €1.8m in compensation after being wrongly jailed for five years over 9/11 has said he wants to put Britain and Spain "on the spot" over a gross injustice that left his life in tatters. Farid Hilali, a Moroccan citizen, was jailed by the UK when it complied with a 2004 European arrest warrant (EAW) issued by Spain that accused him of being an al-Qaida member who passed on messages to the leader of a Spanish logistics cell about the 2001 attacks on New York and Washington. The case never came to trial and was dropped in 2012 when Spain's national court admitted the "inexistence of any kind of evidence" that Hilali was an al-Qaida member. "I want to put Spain and the UK on the spot. I was accused of killing nearly 3,000 Americans and both sides knew there was no evidence," Hilali, 49, who was never formally charged, told the Guardian.

He was freed in 2009 after spending 1,711 days in prison – almost four years in the UK and one more in Spain – but had to stay in Spain, registering daily at a police station and ineligible for a work permit or benefits. Now free, he lives in Barcelona with his wife. Hilali is still waiting for Spain's justice ministry to decide on his claim, but last year the country's top judicial body, the General Council for Judicial Power, produced an advisory report backing his arguments. "My life is ruined. My wife and I suffered a lot. No money can give me back my life but I don't want something like this to happen to anyone else, whether they be from the UK or wherever," he said. Hilali said Spanish prosecutors "disrespected British justice" by presenting false evidence, and he said the UK was compliant. The telephone intercepts that formed the basis of the arrest had already been deemed inadmissible by a Spanish court, but the House of Lords ruled in 2008 that "evidence is not a matter for the requested state" when considering an EAW.

If Spain turned down his compensation claim, Hilali said he would take his case to the European court of human rights. "The EAW should not be automatic. Fundamental rights should be respected, otherwise this goes exactly against European values," he said. A spokesperson for Spain's justice ministry said a further report from the country's State Council advisory body was required before it could decide on Hilali's compensation claim. "We are talking about a case of abnormal functioning in the administration of justice and not a judicial error," the spokesperson said. Hilali, a former UK resident, told the Guardian in 2009 he had been arrested in the United Arab Emirates in 1999 and tortured before a man who said he represented the British government interrogated him about terrorist suspects in London. After a few months he was rendered to his native Morocco. He was eventually returned to the UK and made a claim for asylum in 2003 that included his allegations that Britain ordered his torture.

Oppression is Fashionable Again, the Security State is Back, Fundamental Freedoms in Retreat

Zeid Raad al-Hussein has spent nearly four years fighting a frustrating battle against genocide, oppression, racism — and the increasing indifference to them among governments. Last week he opened the 37th session of the U.N. Human Rights Council, and with the end of his four-year term as high commissioner for human rights in sight, he chose, he said, "to be blunt." His tough conclusions are worth repeating. "Today," Mr. Zeid said, "oppression is fashionable again, the security state is back, and fundamental freedoms are in retreat in every region of the world. Shame is also in retreat. Xenophobes and racists in Europe are casting off any sense of embarrassment." Mr. Zeid didn't shrink from naming the places and people who are violating basic norms. He cited Hungary's Viktor Orban, who recently said "we did not want our color . . . to be mixed in with others," and a Polish minister who said Jews were among the perpetrators of the Holocaust. He spoke of "young girls in El Salvador . . . sentenced to 30 years imprisonment for miscarriages"; of the jailing of journalists "in huge numbers" in Turkey and a human rights defender in Bahrain; of people who "can be killed by police with impunity, because they are poor"; and of ethnic Rohingya in Burma, who are "dehumanized, deprived and slaughtered in their homes."

Of greatest concern to Mr. Zeid are the instances of mass killing that have happened on his watch and that have attracted no meaningful international response. "Eastern Ghouta [and] the other besieged areas in Syria; Ituri and the Kasais in [Congo]; Taiz in Yemen; Burundi; northern Rakhine in Myanmar have become some of the most prolific slaughterhouses of humans in recent times, because not enough was done, early and collectively, to prevent the rising horrors," Mr. Zeid said. "Time and again, my office and I have brought to the attention of the international community violations of human rights which should have served as a trigger for preventive action. Time and again, there has been minimal action."

In particular, Mr. Zeid faulted the U.N. Security Council, which has been paralyzed by vetoes from its permanent members — most recently by Russia and China in the case of Syria. "It is they," Mr. Zeid said, "who must answer before the victims." He cited a French proposal that would restrict use of the veto in cases that the U.N. secretary-general determines involve genocide, crimes against humanity, or large-scale war crimes. More than 115 countries, including Britain, have backed the idea; China, Russia and the United States have not.

Mr. Zeid's most important point concerned the larger effect on international order of disregarding atrocities. Countries tend to set aside human rights problems as "too sensitive," he said, consigning them to the often fruitless sessions of the Human Rights Council. But, he said, "it is the accumulating human rights violations such as these, and not a lack of GDP growth, which will spark the conflicts that can break the world. Why are we doing so little to stop them," Mr. Zeid asked, "even though we should know how dangerous all of this is?" There is, today, no more relevant question.

'Everyone Knows The Criminal Justice System Is In A State Of Crisis'

Mark George QC, 'The Justice Gap': Everyone who works in the Criminal Justice System (CJS) knows there is a crisis and that if not addressed the entire system is in serious danger of collapse. The police won't be able to handle the cases they are required to do. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) won't be able to process cases as they should. Those cases that do get to court will keep collapsing. People will finally lose confidence in the ability of the CJS to do its job.

This is no idle scaremongering, it is already happening. Along with the current scandal of cases that go to trial when the prosecution have failed to make proper disclosure of what is called unused material but is in fact vital evidence in the case, some of you will have read the recent news of the rape case where nine months after the report of the offence the CPS recommended to the police that charges be laid. Nothing then happened for three years before anyone thought to apply for a European Arrest Warrant as the alleged offender was now abroad. Even then there were further unacceptable delays before the woman finally lost patience and all hope of justice and decided to withdraw her complaint.

I suggest there are three factors at work here that have finally come together to create a perfect storm that has resulted in the situation we now face.

First, there has been over the last twenty or more years a series of changes in the law that were designed and have made the situation of those accused of offences more perilous, reduced their chances of a fair trial and with that their prospects of acquittal, and threatens to increase miscarriages of justice and unjust convictions.

Second, there has been a culture shift especially in relation to sex cases which is now exemplified in a policy that requires the police to 'believe the victim' and abandon the principle of investigating a case properly and impartially which in my view has contributed directly to recent miscarriages.

Third, there have been huge cuts in the funding for the police and as a result far fewer officers to do the work. The same has been a recurring problem for the CPS which doesn't have the resources required to fulfil its mandate. For the legal profession there have been huge cuts in fees for the preparation and running of criminal trials. It came as no surprise to many of us therefore that the old issue of disclosure failures has again reared its head.

Changes to the law: I have been in this job 40 years. That is long enough that I can remember when police would claim that every word that had been said in a two hour interview had been accurately recorded in a pocket note book despite the note being no longer than a few pages. Then we had contemporaneous notes. Beautifully written pages of an interview in which a defendant had vigorously denied an offence for some time before inexplicable giving in and confessing all. Both perfect opportunities for the police to claim a suspect had confessed when he hadn't.

The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which came into force in 1986, revolutionised procedure in the police station. In came custody records which recorded what happened to a suspect held in a police station; interviews had to be recorded on tape so everyone could listen to what had been said. Suddenly everyone stopped confessing. Police were furious and it took a series of Court of Appeal decisions to explain to police officers that access to a solicitor meant access when the suspect wanted one not when it was convenient to the police to allow one. But that was 1986, over thirty years ago. And since then I cannot recall a single provision in an Act that was designed to protect the rights of those accused of crime.

There have, however, been plenty of measures clearly designed to make life more difficult for those accused of crime – in short designed to bump up the conviction rates. Whilst that might be a laudable aim in itself, it is a sad fact evidently lost on government ministers that you can't increase conviction rates just of the guilty. Rather, it means sacrificing the innocent as well, and bit by bit that famous saying of Sir William Blackstone that it is better that ten guilty men go free than that one innocent man should be condemned gets turned on its head.

And so we have seen the end of the requirement for a warning about the dangers of convicting in the absence of evidence to corroborate a complaint of a sexual offence (section 32 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJ&POA) 1994). This may not have been greatly mourned at the time but at that time there were few prosecutions for sexual offences going back decades as we see today. Now we are in the grip of a collective nervous breakdown about the extent of sexual offending with no limit on the age of allegations being prosecuted, the decision to abolish the requirement for at least a warning about the lack of any corroboration for the evidence of the complainant looks more short-sighted than ever.

Adverse inferences from exercising what is still called the "right to silence", were introduced by section 34 of the CJ&POA (interviews) and section 35 (evidence). How can it still even be called a right when you get criticised for exercising it? How many other rights can you think of that result

in you being criticised when you exercise them? These act as an invitation to a jury to conclude that a silent defendant must have something to hide and is therefore guilty when there might be all manner of perfectly sensible reasons for not answering police questions in interview (often at a time when the strength of the police evidence is far from clear) or not giving evidence in court when you know you will be no match for a confident well educated barrister.

The right of silence, the right not to incriminate yourself remains in my view, a key pillar of any society that purports to have fair trials and to follow the rule of law. If the prosecution cannot prove a case against someone without getting a confession then my view is the prosecution should not go ahead. I don't believe that way leads to the end of civilisation. The Americans thought the right not to incriminate yourself was so important it is enshrined in their Constitution, drafted in the 1780s, and I do not think there is any evidence their criminal justice system functions any less well on that account.

The requirement to serve defence statements was introduced by the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act (CPIA) 1996. Allegedly defective Defence Statements, because they lack sufficient detail, also attract adverse inferences. It seemed to me at the time and still does to fly in the face of an adversarial system. Although of course therein lies another issue. There are those, particularly amongst the higher judiciary, who think we ought to move more towards an inquisitorial system in which there is greater openness between the parties.

The Defence Statement and the requirement to serve one was sold to us as a sort of quid pro quo for greater disclosure, the idea being that if the defence set out their case the disclosure of relevant material will follow. As we have been so eloquently reminded by a spate of recent cases disclosure remains a serious problem. At the time the CPIA became law the argument was that there had been serious miscarriages of justice in notorious cases such as those of the Birmingham Six and Guildford Four because of a failure on the part of the prosecution to disclose material that might help the defence. Many of us thought the whole point of the CPIA was to try to deal with this problem.

But what the CPIA did was to replace a system in which it was the police who decided what should be disclosed to the defence with a system in which it was for the police still to decide what should be disclosed to the defence. In other words, no real change at all.

For all that we get lengthy schedules of disclosure there remain too many cases in which information is not disclosed that the prosecution should know full well ought to be disclosed because it easily meets any test for disclosure. Leaving disclosure in the hand of one party to the proceedings is obviously not the right solution. There were concerns raised by the police at the time about "handing the keys to the warehouse" to the defence, but frankly it is the defence and only the defence who are in a position to know what material the prosecution has which might assist the defence case. Until that concern is addressed the problems will persist.

Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1998 imposed strict limitations on legitimate questioning in sex cases. You don't have to be a fan of Donald Trump's approach to sexual behaviour to realise what problems this was likely to throw up. In fact as you will no doubt know from the case of R v A (No.2), section 41 was initially interpreted so strictly that it prevented a man who claimed he had been in a relationship with a woman for some time from referring to the occasions when they had undoubtedly had consensual sex in order to explain his belief that she was consenting at the time of the alleged offence. The House of Lords declared the section incompatible with the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and said the section would have to

be "read down" in order to avoid gross unfairness. That section of course has caused plenty of controversy as the recent re-trial of Ched Evans shows.

Of course, witnesses must be treated with respect and I am not for one second suggesting we should return to the days when apparently some defence advocates thought a good way of winning the case was to humiliate a woman complainant with questions about what underwear she was wearing at the time. Equally however we cannot allow what has to be a careful compromise between the rights of both parties to become so one-sided that properly admissible evidence is excluded on the specious grounds that this only adds to the suffering of the complainant and merely compounds the suffering caused by the alleged offence. Allegations of sexual assault are very serious. Those convicted can expect very long prison sentences. As a result allegations such as rape cannot and should not be accepted at face value. They must be tested in court by thorough and appropriate questioning.

The regular use of any evidence of an accused's bad character was permitted by the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003. For as long as any of us can remember the bad character of a defendant had always been kept out save for certain exceptions because everyone accepted that the prejudicial effect of a jury trying a case knowing that the defendant had form for the offence charged made his chances of acquitted disappearingly small. This measure was introduced by Labour Home Secretary David Blunkett, thereby turning Tony Blair's famous claim that Labour was going to be "tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime" into what in effect became "tough on crime and tough on those accused of crime".

The same could be said about the hearsay provisions in the CJA 2003. From long ago in our history it was one of the corner stones of English law that hearsay evidence with all the risks about unreliability was not allowed save for a very few exceptional circumstances. Now the law allows the police to tip off the witnesses they don't have to come to court if they claim they are scared of the defendant or his mates. Hearsay evidence may be very convenient to the police and prosecution but its widespread use is not compatible with an adversarial system. Its increased use however is all part of the drift towards a more inquisitorial system in which everything vaguely relevant gets thrown in, the judges think it best to leave it to the jury, and the jury are then asked to sort it out. The CJA 2003 even allowed police officers to sit on juries. How can that possibly be fair and what possible reason can there have been for such a change unless it was intend to help push up conviction rates?

Section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 allows for cross-examination of complainants in certain cases, mostly those involving sexual allegations to be conducted in advance of the trial and after your list of questions has been "marked" by the judge. This is not something I have personally been required to do but as I am sure you will know some judges see this as a chance to emasculate a half decent cross-examination in the full knowledge the Court of Appeal will back them up. This is a provision that only someone with no experience of trials could have dreamed up. Trials are dynamic processes. How the evidence finishes up at the end of the case is often quite different to how it looked at the start.

Questioning a witness in an evidential vacuum in advance of the trial is a travesty that our forebears would have regarded with horror. It is all part of the new cuddly idea that witnesses in sexual allegations can't be making it up and have to be believed for fear of doing them even more damage. It has no place in an adversarial system where allegations must be challenged robustly.

No advocate who wants to win the case can risk turning the jury against him or her. Of course, questioning has to be sensitive. You can't cross-examine a five-year-old making an allegation against her step-dad like you can a flying squad officer. On the other hand, we

don't need witnesses being molly-coddled in the way envisaged by section 28. And all this designed to bump up conviction rates with never a care as to whether this means bumping up the rate of wrongful convictions.

And finally, there was an important amendment to the rules on loss of control (the old defence of provocation) in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 which took sexual infidelity out of the equation. No one condones domestic violence. When it results in the death of a woman it is particularly shocking. But equally everyone knows than that nothing is more likely to provoke a spontaneous outbreak of anger and violence than suggestions of sexual infidelity. Denying an accused a defence based on that simple fact of life is unjust. So, you can see that we have been merrily stoking the fires of potential miscarriages of justice or some years now.

Changes in policy: A sense of moral panic has gripped social workers and senior police officers who have realised far too late in the day that for years they let down many complainants in sexual assault case because there was a time when women weren't taken seriously and children weren't even listened to. Now there is an unseemly scramble of back-covering which has meant we have simply traded one bad policy for another.

In recent years police officers have been instructed by the College of Policing that they must "believe the victim" because if they don't they risk adding further to the trauma that person has already suffered. Assuming of course the allegation is a true one. That policy is wrong on a number of levels as the former High Court judge Sir Richard Henriques pointed out in his 2016 report when he said, first, no one should be referred to as a victim until the allegation they make has been proved either by a guilty plea or by a verdict of a jury. Second, it is not the job of the police to believe any person who makes a complaint. That is a matter for the courts. Of course, they should treat a complainant with respect and courtesy but the police are there to investigate an alleged crime, see where the evidence leads keeping a mind open to the possibility that evidence will be found that undermines the prosecution case. It is not the job of the police to favour one side against another.

As Sir Richard pointed out "believe the victim" undermines the presumption of innocence by assuming from the very outset that the allegation is proved. Such policies lead to a situation in which the police can be duped by a fantasist such as man known as "Nick" (the allegations that a ring of paedophile senior politicians and other establishment figures were having sex orgies with young boys and murdering them into the bargain). And you will no doubt recall that a senior officer involved in that investigation announcing that in his opinion Nick's allegations were credible when it was none of his business to do anything of the kind.

I have no doubt this policy has contributed to the atmosphere in which near disasters like the cases of Liam Allen and Danny Kay could happen. After all, if police officers are told by their managers that they must believe the victim why would they want to go looking for evidence that might undermine that allegation? Why interrogate a complainant's phone when you might find unhelpful messages that destroy the complainant's case?

A case in Oxford recently ended with the jury acquitting seven men of a series of allegations of underage sex. As a direct result a second trial of another ten men was abandoned. When the acquittals were reported in the press the Senior Investigating Officer stated that: It was right that the case was brought to court so that a jury could hear and consider the evidence and the defendants could have an opportunity to answer to the case against them. Thames Valley Police respects the decision of the jury.

That level of ignorance of the purpose of a criminal trial will shock any first-year law student. Since when did we decide to put people on trial so that they have the opportunity to answer

the case against them when in fact there is no such case?

I don't think anyone involved in criminal cases ever thought that it was only sex cases that were encountering problems with disclosure. We had the recent example of a people trafficking case that collapsed because of major disclosures failures. Five years ago I was involved in a multi-handed murder trial which collapsed because the police failed to disclose evidence that supported the defence case that what had been intended was a knee-capping and not a murder, so this problem although very serious is not one of recent making. Back in 2011 the trial of a large number of activists who had tried to shut down a power station collapsed because the police had failed to reveal the activities of an undercover police officer, so this is something that had been going on for years. It is of course good that the matter has finally become of interest to the press and that finally something may actually be done about it.

Funding for the CJS: The CPS has always been under severe financial pressure. Staff retention and sickness are other problems that arise from unrealistic caseloads. Cuts to police numbers and resources have been well advertised. At the same time fees paid for criminal work has been slashed by Labour, Coalition and Tory governments.

The current fees structure for legal aid in crime is more than twenty years old. There have been no pay increases in that time. Instead there have been huge cuts so that lawyers are often paid less today than was the case before the current fee regime was introduced. Lawyers usually do not get paid for reading unused material. Barristers like Julia Smart, who represented Liam Allen do work like that every day of the week out of a sense of pride in the job and a passion to do the job properly. But there is a real risk that hard pressed defence lawyers will make mistakes, or worse not do the work required that also lead to miscarriages.

I don't take much pleasure in being right. Some of us have been saying for years that cuts have consequences. Few public services have much fat to spare and the CJS is not one of them. We have been cut beyond the bone and the fabric of the system is collapsing.

It was shameful that the Director of Public Prosecutions when announcing a review of all current sex cases to see if there had been similar issues about disclosure failed to mention the lack of resources her service has to cope with. She owed it to the employees of the CPS as well as everyone affected by crime to speak out and say that what was happening had to be down at least in part to the endless cuts to resources. And the government are no better. The Attorney-General recently went out of his way to tell the House of Commons that resources and cuts had nothing to do with the recent spate of collapsed cases.

The CJS has also not been helped by the fact that we have had a series of Secretaries of State for Justice aka Lord Chancellor who few had ever heard of, who have appeared to have little interest in their department or seen it as an opportunity to advance their own careers. So we had the truly dreadful Chris Grayling with his slash and burn policy, Liz Truss who evidently didn't understand her job or weren't there long enough for anyone to notice such as David Lidington. Michael Gove did express some concerns but was almost immediately moved because of Brexit. What the CJS badly needs is a minister who cares about justice, is embarrassed by the dreadful state of the current system and is prepared to fight for more resources.

The Failures of the Court of Appeal and the CCRC

It seems to me that the Court of Appeal (CoA) has lost its way. The CoA seems to me for some time to have become less and less interested in dealing with miscarriages of justice unless the case is entirely blatant. Procedural errors, incorrect rulings on admissibility of bad character and hearsay are shrugged off as being well within the discretion of the judge and

errors by the judge in summing-up are dismissed by claiming that the case was so overwhelming that it wouldn't have made any difference if the judge had got it right.

Nothing more clearly illustrates the problem than the attitude of the courts towards joint enterprise. I blame the Supreme Court who made it clear in paragraph 100 of the judgment in R v Jogee that the mere fact that the courts had spent the last 30 years misdirecting juries about the law on joint enterprise was no reason for finding convictions unsafe. Emboldened by that the Court of Appeal has shown scant interest in seeking to remedy potentially wrongful convictions.

You will be hearing from representatives from the Criminal Case Review Commission (CCRC). I have no doubt they will tell you how keen they are to work with you but that if they are to make any progress you need to make an application. They will urge you to contact them possibly in advance of your submission so they can help on specific points. And all for what?

This is an organisation that likes to say "No". They have a high success rate of 70%. They are keen to protect that success rate and in my view they have become slaves to it. They are required to second guess what the CoA will do if they do refer the case and they know better than anyone that the CoA is hostile to fresh appeals. They won't take risks. To many of my colleagues it appears the CCRC has been cajoled into not making too many references and in return the courts will back the CCRC up when it refuses to refer a case. There has not been a single contested judicial review in which a decision of the CCRC not to refer has been overturned.

The CCRC has been tamed and does as its told and miscarriage cases do not make the progress they should. The culture of the CoA also needs to change. Rather than the endlessly defensive position and constant attempts to limit the number of appeals they ought to recognise that it is their job to ensure so far as they can that wrongful convictions can be properly addressed rather than being summarily dismissed.

Those of you doing miscarriage work can perhaps now see at least in part how we came to be in the position we find ourselves and what we are all up against.

How Do 11 People Go To Jail For One Murder?

Harry Stopes, 'The Justice Gap': Can you be convicted of a killing if you were there when somebody else dealt the fatal blow? The law says so – especially if you're young and black. At 5.13pm on Thursday 12 May 2016, a young man named Abdul Wahab Hafidah was seen on CCTV cameras running westward through busy traffic across Princess Road in Moss Side, a crowded, diverse, working-class neighbourhood two miles south of Manchester city centre. He was pursued by two young men on foot, and another on a bicycle. As traffic slowed at the junction of Princess Road and Moss Lane East, Hafidah tried desperately to open the door of a passing car, before turning to face his pursuers, waving a knife. They stepped back, and he ran off down Moss Lane East. Someone threw a hammer at him, but missed. The chase went on, joined or followed by seven other young men who made their way across Princess Road over the next 45 seconds.

Hafidah was drunk, and he was scared. He knew some of the boys who were chasing him, and he knew they were angry with him. On Moss Lane East, he tried once more to get into a passing vehicle. As he ran across the street, he was hit by more than one car, one of which was a Vauxhall Corsa, driven by a friend of some of those pursuing him. A pathologist later found that he had suffered leg injuries suggesting "a glancing blow" at low speed.

At around 5.14pm, near the junction of Moss Lane East and Denhill Road, roughly 100 metres west of Princess Road, several of Hafidah's pursuers caught up to him. He was punched, kicked and stamped on, although witnesses remember the details and the num-

ber of attackers differently. According to statements taken by the police, a student walking home from college saw “at least three or four” people drag Hafidah to the ground, punching and kicking him. A man working in an office overlooking the scene saw “a couple of youths” fighting on the northern side of the road, and “six or seven youths” watching from a nearby grass verge. Another witness, a lab assistant, thought there were five attackers. A woman on her way home from work saw three young men knock Hafidah to the ground. He curled up into a ball while they kicked him around the legs, torso and head. “Don’t you think you’ve done enough? Get off him!” the woman coming home from work shouted at the assailants, according to her witness statement. All but two ran away; one of those two continued to beat Hafidah. The lab assistant thought the other young man was telling the attacker to leave it and run, but that the attacker ignored him. The attacker was “really angry”, she thought, and was shouting at Hafidah as he kicked him. She noticed that the attacker’s face was covered, and that he was wearing gloves, despite the weather that day, which was clear and warm. Then he bent over Hafidah and stabbed him in the neck. The attacker ran off after the others, most of whom were already at least 20 metres away. The assault had lasted 30-40 seconds.

“No, no, no,” the lab assistant cried as she ran towards Hafidah. “Not another one of our boys!” A man on his way home from Asda tried to press the victim’s hood against his neck to stop the bleeding. With some of his last words, Hafidah asked this man to tell his family that he loved them. Paramedics arrived. The shopper and the lab assistant sat on the grass verge and cried. Hafidah died two days later in Manchester Royal Infirmary. He was 18 years old.

In the weeks following his death, 17 young people were arrested in connection with the killing. The young man who stabbed Hafidah – who would eventually admit to the crime after he was sentenced to life imprisonment in September last year – was a 19-year-old named Devonte Cantrill. A six-month investigation led police to the same conclusion. In an interview room at Longsight police station on 15 November 2016, Cantrill was asked several times why he committed the crime. “We explained to your solicitor that our enquiries so far would suggest that you were the person that put a knife in Abdul Hafidah’s throat,” a detective constable told Cantrill. “I’m suggesting to you that you are the person that has killed Hafidah. Let’s be as direct as that.”

But shortly after that interview, Cantrill and 12 other young people were charged with the murder. Most had no criminal history. Before the fight that led to Abdul’s death, most of the group had spent the afternoon hanging around a local park, listening to music or kicking a football around. One had spent it with his infant son, and two of the other accused were about to have a baby together. Prosecutors alleged they were members of a gang and had intended, as a group, to assist in the killing. Last summer, four of them were convicted of manslaughter, including Devon’ta Neish, 17, who was on a bicycle at the back of the group chasing Hafidah, and never got off his bike to attack him. Their sentences range from five to 12 years.

Cantrill and six others were found guilty of murder. These included Nathaniel Jermaine Williams, 17, the driver of the Corsa, a keen footballer who worked part-time in Nando’s – who did not get out of his car during the fight – and his school friend Reano Walters, 18, who seemed from mobile phone footage shot in the aftermath of the attack to have been around 20 metres away at the moment of the stabbing. Williams and Walters had spent part of the afternoon driving around in the Corsa, just passing time and showing off to girls in the neighbourhood, Walters later testified. The prosecution had accused them of conducting a “high-visibility patrol” of their alleged gang territory. All seven young men found guilty of murder were handed life sentences, with a minimum tariff of 23 years for Cantrill, and sentences ranging from 16 to 20 years for the six who had not stabbed Hafidah.

How did a stabbing by one young man lead to 11 convictions? The answer is one of the most controversial principles in English law. There are a number of ways a person can be convicted for a crime in which they did not play the decisive role – or even, perhaps, any role at all. Collectively, they are known as “joint enterprise”, a principle of common law stretching back hundreds of years. In one well-known case, from 1952, Derek Bentley was convicted of murder after his accomplice in a burglary, Christopher Craig, shot a police officer. “Let him have it, Chris,” Bentley had said, perhaps telling Craig to hand over his weapon – or perhaps, as the prosecution argued, urging him to fire. Under joint enterprise, Bentley had provided what is known as “assistance or encouragement” and was therefore just as guilty as Craig, the “principal” offender. Bentley received a pardon in 1998, although he had been executed by hanging 45 years previously.

A more recent controversial example was the conviction of Laura Mitchell and her boyfriend, Michael Hall. One night in 2007, the couple, and two other people they were with, got into a fight in a car park outside a Bradford pub, with a man named Andrew Ayres, over who had booked a taxi. Mitchell and Hall then left the scene so that she could search a different part of the car park for her lost shoes. In the meantime, the other two defendants went to a nearby house and armed themselves with knuckledusters and other weapons. In a second, more serious fight, which did not involve Mitchell or Hall, Ayres was killed. The two armed men were convicted of murder, but so too were Mitchell and Hall. Their convictions were upheld by an appeals court in October 2016.

In another case often cited by campaigners against the abuse of joint enterprise, Jordan Cunliffe, who was then 15, was one of three people convicted of the 2007 murder of Garry Newlove. Newlove was killed by a kick to the neck by one of a group of local teenagers, who attacked him after he accused them of vandalising his car. Cunliffe argues that although he was present, he never touched Newlove – a claim supported by the fact that he suffers from a degenerative eye condition, and was registered as blind at the time. “If you can do that to a blind 15-year-old, you can do it to anyone – and obviously it’s been done to a lot of people,” his mother, Janet, said to the Guardian two years ago. Cunliffe remains in prison.

There could be more than 1,000 similar cases. The government does not collect statistics on joint enterprise; officially, a joint-enterprise murder is just another murder, and it is difficult to be sure whether or not prosecutions are becoming more common. But one study, by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), found that between 2005 and 2013, 1,853 people were prosecuted for homicides involving four or more defendants. Such cases consistently represented about 15-20% of homicide prosecutions each year.

Joint enterprise has also come under increasing scrutiny in recent years because of a growing body of academic research that appears to show it is applied disproportionately against black defendants. According to one study, black people are serving time under joint enterprise at 11 times their presence in the population as a whole. All of these issues have been at the forefront of a campaign to reform joint enterprise law, led by Jengba (Joint Enterprise Not Guilty By Association), a group representing the family members of nearly 1,000 people locked up under joint enterprise.

It’s not that joint enterprise is always wrong in principle. “An example I always give in which joint enterprise is not remotely problematic would be where four people attack the victim, three of them hold him down, and the fourth one stabs him,” said Simon Natas, a partner at ITN Solicitors in London, who has acted for Jengba. “They’re all guilty of murder. It doesn’t matter that the other three are not wielding the knife.”

But the trouble is that homicides are not always so straightforward, especially in cases of

spontaneous violence, such as a street fight. One defendant might throw a few punches without intending that anybody should use a knife. Should their commission of assault imply their guilt of murder? And what about defendants like Cunliffe, who were present at a killing, but did not participate, or Mitchell and Hall, who weren't present at all? In their 2014 study, TBIJ found countless examples of people incarcerated for murder or manslaughter in situations like these.The increasing visibility of such convictions in the last decade-and-a-half has caused joint enterprise to suffer from what the Prison Reform Trust calls a "deficit in legitimacy". Thirty-seven of 43 lawyers interviewed by TBIJ expressed concern about the way the law operates.

Joint enterprise's crisis of legitimacy has also been intensified by its grossly unequal application. In a study of the cases of 294 people under 26 who were given sentences of 15 years or more, researchers at Cambridge University found that those convicted under joint enterprise comprised more than half of their sample, and observed a stark pattern in the composition of this group: more than half were black or mixed-race. Black and mixed-race people are already over-represented in the criminal justice system, as a report by David Lammy MP, in 2017, documented in painful detail. But even taking their disproportionate presence in the system as a baseline, black and mixed-race prisoners convicted under joint enterprise were over-represented by a factor of three in the Cambridge study.

The vast majority of homicides in England and Wales like the vast majority of most crimes are committed by white people, who make up 86% of the population. But the patterns found in the Cambridge study have been frequently reproduced by other researchers. It seems there is something different about joint enterprise. A Prison Reform Trust study of 61 joint-enterprise cases involving 157 defendants found that for defendants whose ethnicity was known, around two-thirds were from ethnic minorities. More than 40% were black. Almost two-thirds were under 25. Similar disproportionality has been found by researchers at Manchester Metropolitan University. Ethnic-minority joint-enterprise prisoners are younger than their white counterparts when convicted, are tried with a larger number of co-defendants and serve longer sentences.

All 11 of those convicted in the Moss Side case are black or mixed-race. The youngest was 14 at the time of the attack, and the oldest was 20. Their family members say that the academic research confirms their fear that their loved ones have been convicted in part because of the colour of their skin. "The jury made up their mind as soon as they saw them," said Devon'ta Neish's aunt Anna, an administrator at a local school. "They saw black boys from Moss Side, they heard 'gangs', and that was it."

A joint enterprise case, perhaps more than most murders, requires a narrative. The jury must be made to understand how a fractured and sometimes confusing evidential picture, involving multiple participants with different types and levels of involvement, should be assembled.

After years of growing controversy, a landmark supreme court decision in February 2016 appeared to set a stringent new standard for joint enterprise convictions. In "R v Jogee", the court ruled that mere foresight that a crime such as murder might occur was not sufficient grounds for convicting a secondary offender. Instead, the prosecution would have to show that a defendant also intended for the crime to be committed. Campaigners and legal scholars hoped this would put an end to disproportionate joint enterprise convictions, but the successful prosecution of the Moss Side case has cast this into doubt.

In terms of the number of defendants, the Moss Side case was one of the largest ever joint enterprise murder trials. According to the prosecution, there was only one way to assemble the pieces of the story: the defendants were part of a criminal gang, determined to attack en masse a member of a rival gang. As the judge explained in his directions to the jury: "When

two or more persons join together to chase and to attack someone, each is liable for the acts done in furtherance of their joint purpose."

In order to be found guilty under joint enterprise, a defendant must meet two criteria: the first relates to their actions, and the second to their state of mind. In the Moss Side case, the prosecution argued that each defendant had acted in some way to contribute to the fatal attack – by beating up Hafidah before he was stabbed, by helping to chase him down or by offering implicit support through their presence. In law, this is known as the "conduct element": an action that facilitated the offence of the principal offender. Prosecutors must also demonstrate a "mental element", relating to the state of mind of the "secondary" defendant the one who did not directly commit the crime. According to the new standard set by the Jogee decision, to be found guilty, a secondary defendant must share the same intention as the principal defendant. In the Moss Side case, this meant demonstrating their intention to kill or, in the words of the judge in the Moss Side case, "at least cause some really serious injury".

But R v Jogee did not do away altogether with the question of "foresight" that a crime would be committed: while it was no longer enough to convict a secondary defendant just by showing that they could have foreseen a murder, the fact of that foresight could still be used as evidence of shared intent. The prosecution in the Moss Side case pointed to the presence of a hammer during the chase, and the possibility that a defendant other than Cantrill might have also had a knife, to suggest that the defendants must have foreseen that weapons would be used, fatally.

If the Moss Side defendants could foresee the use of a deadly weapon and still continued the chase, the prosecution argued, they must have intended it. This seems to make the Jogee decision much more equivocal than many activists had first hoped. "If intention can be readily inferred from foresight, then nothing will have changed," Beatrice Krebs, an associate professor in law at the University of Reading, said. "But it depends, of course, on what is happening in practice."

The Jengba lawyer Simon Natas disagrees that knowledge of weapons always demonstrates a defendant's intention that serious harm should be caused. "You need to look at what that knowledge actually implied, what their conduct was in relation to the weapon, what their conduct was in the course of the incident," Natas said. Hafidah was not struck with the hammer, nor was he stabbed by anyone other than Cantrill. If the others were carrying lethal weapons and intended to use them against Hafidah, why did they not do so?

Some of the defendants say they only ran after the commotion to see what happened, or, like the 29-year-old Cordell Austin – the only defendant to be acquitted – to look out for the safety of younger boys. Those who appeared, in CCTV footage, to be near the front of the chase as it crossed Princess Road said they had disengaged before the fight began. (The fight itself was not caught on camera.) Nobody admitted to having participated in the attack itself, perhaps afraid of incriminating themselves, or of being forced to describe the actions of others.

Some of the defendants knew Hafidah, and regarded him with a mixture of fear and hostility. Local youth workers knew him, and had had concerns about him – he was someone they wanted to protect, but they also knew he had been responsible for violence against others. Some of the boys had been attacked or threatened by him in the past, or knew of others who had been. Some, though not all, likely bore a grudge against him.

In the five or so minutes before the chase began, the group were hanging around in a park by Westwood Street, chatting and listening to music. Hafidah was hiding in the grounds of a nearby derelict building. According to the courtroom testimony of several defendants, Hafidah began throwing stones at one of their cars. His judgment impaired by alcohol – he was around 1.5 times over the drink-driving limit – he might have been trying to engineer a confrontation.

In this reading, the chase that ensued was spontaneous, with each participant having a different understanding of what was going on, and what would happen if Hafidah was caught. “Probably two or three of them actually wanted to have a fight with him,” according to Akemia Minott, a local youth worker who knew most of the defendants. “Others wanted to see what was happening. I think one had the intention to stab him.” But the claim that the defendants were members of a gang helped prosecutors argue that they shared the same joint purpose, no matter how peripheral their conduct was to the act of killing Hafidah. According to the crown’s QC, Nicholas Johnson, the chase was “a co-ordinated effort” involving all 13 defendants.

Even the most trivial facts became evidence of this gang intention, including some that might have also suggested a lack of coordination. Devon’ta Neish, for example, took a slightly different route as he followed the others towards Princess Road. The prosecution argued that he was trying to “head off” Hafidah in the hypothetical event that he attempted to double back and escape. Rather than a spontaneous fight taken to another level by one angry young man, in the prosecution story, each defendant had played his role in the gang violence.

Hafidah sustained dozens of injuries from the many blows he received on Moss Lane East, but the pathologist judged that none of these contributed to his death. After a woman shouted at the attackers to stop, only Devonte Cantrill continued to attack Hafidah. He had been the last to arrive at the scene on Moss Lane East. He was the only attacker to cover his face, to wear gloves, and to strike Hafidah with a weapon. According to one witness, he seemed to be in a state of fury. Cantrill had had some difficult times in his life, and it was not the first time he had been violent. By the time he was arrested for Hafidah’s murder, he had been kicked out of the bail hostel where he was living in Salford, and was homeless. He had a previous conviction for head-butting a PCSO, for which he received a custodial sentence. While inside, he attacked a prison officer. “I was an angry kid back then,” he told police when asked about these incidents. He also told them that once, when he was in Deerbolt young offender institution, he went to the doctor for help with his mental health. But, he said: “I didn’t even chat to her properly. I spoke to her and then two days, three days, I got shipped out.”

The rhetorical association of minority especially black youth, with gangs and violence is a persistent feature of the British criminal justice system. And alleged gang rivalry is a frequent element in joint enterprise prosecutions. Becky Clarke and Patrick Williams, researchers from Manchester Metropolitan University, found that almost two-thirds of joint enterprise prisoners reported that “gang” links had been alleged during their trials. There is not only a racial disparity in the application of joint enterprise; there is also a racial disparity in the use of “gang” evidence in prosecutions. Clarke and Williams found that 78.9% of ethnic-minority joint enterprise prisoners had been described as gang members by prosecutors, compared to only 38.5% of whites.

Although young black people are more likely to be suspected by the police of being gang members, they commit a proportionally small amount of violence. In their study, published in 2016, Clarke and Williams found that 81% of the individuals on Greater Manchester police’s list of suspected gang members were black. Yet during the same period, black youth were responsible for just 6% of serious violence by young people in Manchester. Similar patterns were found in London, where Metropolitan police data showed that in 2015-2016 less than 5% of serious youth violence was linked to alleged gang members. “Serious youth violence does not equal gang crime,” the former deputy mayor for policing and crime, Stephen Greenhalgh, has said.

To Clarke, the disparity between the policing priorities and the reality of offending is striking. “When you plot the youth violence data on a map, you see these hotspots in north Manchester and Wythenshawe, and little ones in central-south. About 70% of the people who represent all of the marks on those hotspots were white British.” But when you look at the map of alleged gang members, “there’s just this one big hotspot, right in Moss Side.”

The evidence of gang membership that prosecutors bring to bear in joint enterprise trials is often of questionable merit, according to Clarke and Williams. In the Moss Side case, the prosecution alleged that a few of the defendants were linked to the gang “Active Only” with photographs from the defendants’ social media accounts in which they made what the prosecution claimed were gang “hand signs”. According to DCI Terry Crompton, who led the murder investigation in this case, this evidence represented “self-admission” of gang membership. The boys and their families reject this. “Get any boy from round here, they don’t like to just stand straight in a picture, they love to do something with their hands,” a sister of one of the defendants said. “You’re calling these boys gang members for doing what you’re paying rappers to do on the TV.”

The 13 defendants were not a particularly close group, but it was easy to find links between them. Moss Side has been the heart of Manchester’s African-Caribbean and African communities since the 1950s, and it was easy for police to identify social or family connections between the defendants, which were then characterised as gang associations. “We know you’re best buds with Durrell Ford because all your profile pictures are the same on Facebook,” an officer trying to portray the boys as gang members said to Durrell Goodall, 19, an amateur athlete who was among the second group to chase Abdul across Princess Road. Ford was also 19, and the two boys had been friends since Goodall’s mother moved to Moss Side when he was seven, having found the east Manchester neighbourhood of Clayton too racist to raise a mixed-race boy. Two of the other boys played football together, others went to the same youth club, or were neighbours.

For Crompton, these links were enough to suspect all the defendants of being gang members. “We have some clear evidence from self-admissions,” he told me, referring to the photographs in which some of the young men made hand signs. Some of the others “may or may not be” gang members, he added, “but they certainly associated together, at least on the day”. In court, the prosecution tried to finesse these ambiguities by suggesting that any defendants that were not actually gang members were “affiliated with or sympathetic to” the gang, but Crompton admitted that these were not terms he could define.

Surprisingly, given the focus on the Active Only gang during the trial, a “senior police source” initially told the Manchester Evening News, 12 days after the murder, that it had been committed by a gang called the Moss Side Bloods. Months later, during police interviews in November 2016, several defendants were still being asked about alleged associations with that gang.

But when I asked Crompton about how soon investigators had determined that Active Only was responsible, he said it had been “pretty quickly” after the killing. (When I reminded him of the Moss Side Bloods theory, he said he wasn’t sure that gang still existed.) It was hard to avoid the conclusion that the gang theory might have been formulated before police knew which gang to attribute the violence to. Similarly, Crompton doubted that you could map the territory allegedly controlled by Active Only – a direct contradiction of what a police expert witness said at the trial.

There is a striking discrepancy between the more complex picture admitted privately by the senior police officer who led the investigation, and the certainty with which the prosecution presented the case in court. While youth violence is a very real problem, the “gang” framework is shaped primarily by police wishing to impose order on a situation that is fundamentally chaotic. This imposed order creates the narrative clarity that enables joint enterprise convictions.

For the family members, this practice represents bad faith. “Some of the things they’re saying you know they’re blatantly lying about your children,” said the mother of Reano Walters,

who was convicted of murder and sentenced to life with a minimum term of 20 years. “You know they’re lying. Deep down in their hearts, they know that half of what they’re saying is a lie.”

In responding to the challenges of youth violence, some seem more interested in getting convictions than securing justice. “What you’ve got to decide is not: ‘Does the system lead to people being wrongly convicted?’,” the former Labour lord chancellor Charles Falconer told the BBC in 2010, while discussing joint enterprise. “I think the real question is: ‘Do you want a law as draconian as our law is, which says juries can convict even if you are quite a peripheral member of the gang which killed?’ And I think broadly the view of reasonable people is that you probably do need a quite draconian law in that respect.”

But concerns about the dual injustice of joint enterprise both in overcharging individuals for their roles in crimes, and in the racially disproportionate way the law is applied have dogged joint enterprise for years, as reports by the House of Commons justice select committee noted in 2012 and 2014. Lucy Powell, MP for Manchester Central, believes that these fears have been proven right once again in the case of Hafidah’s murder. “Charging 13 people with murder, when clearly 13 people were not actually involved in the act of murder directly, I thought was disproportionate,” Powell told me. “And I think a lot of people involved, in the police and the CPS, deep down, think that as well. For another stabbing in a white community like Clayton, which is also in my constituency would joint enterprise have been used to this extent? I don’t think so.”

In his 2017 report on race in the criminal justice system, David Lammy MP stated that the government should adopt an “explain or reform” principle for racial disparities across the system.

What can explain the racially biased outcomes of joint enterprise? Does the requirement to speculate about the mental state rather than simply the actions of a defendant lead police, prosecutors and juries to assume the worst of certain people? “We always said in our research that the ‘why’ was racism,” Becky Clarke told me. “Understanding racism in its institutional forms, in its everyday forms, is fundamentally the ‘why’.”

Ben Crewe, one of the co-authors of the Cambridge study, is deeply concerned about the ongoing use of joint enterprise in light of its demonstrable racial disparity. The fact that one particular practice of the criminal law seems to so disproportionately target young black men – even more than the rest of the criminal justice system – “must tell us something very concerning about this society,” Crewe told me. “Something’s gone wrong somewhere along the line.”

For the young men in Moss Side and their families, the consequences have been devastating. Nathaniel Jermaine Williams, the driver of the Corsa, was sentenced to at least 19 years for murder. His brother cannot bring himself to explain it to his son, and has told him that Uncle Jermaine went to Australia to pursue his football career. Williams’s father, Remi, has suffered intense low moods. Durrell Ford’s mother will take a second job to cover the cost of travelling to County Durham to see her son in prison. Devon’ta Neish’s mother doesn’t know whether she’ll be able to travel to see her son at all. The mother of a 15-year-old sentenced to five years for manslaughter took months off her nursing job with stress, and still suffers from headaches and vertigo. Reano Walters, who will be at least 39 when he is released, is afraid he won’t be able to have children.

The youth worker Akemia Minott, who has known most of the defendants for years, is consumed by anger. “I don’t understand how they can justify themselves,” she said of the police and the courts. “It’s not a game. This shit’s not a game, this is real people’s lives. These lives aren’t less valuable than yours, these lives aren’t inferior to yours, or insignificant in comparison to yours. So why is the criminal justice system of a supposedly civilised and advanced country able to use certain people as just pawns in their game of chess?”

Neglect and Failure to Provide Basic Care to Michael Forster Contributed to His Death

The inquest into the death of Michael Dean Forster has concluded that neglect and several failings in care contributed to his death. Michael, known as Mike, died on 21 November 2016 at the age of 26, having been discovered with a ligature around his neck on 19 November at HMP Leicester. Mike suffered with psychosis and had a history of mental ill health. The inquest heard that in the months leading up to his death, he frequently expressed delusions including that he was going to be killed. Mike was remanded to HMP Leicester on 4 October 2016. Upon arriving at HMP Leicester, suicide and self-harm prevention procedures (known as ACCT) were started. Mike was referred to the Mental Health Team and a psychiatrist. On 14 October had an appointment with a psychiatrist who believed Mike was psychotic and requested an assessment to commence the process of being moved to a secure hospital. Mike was still awaiting assessment at the time of his death. During the inquest, evidence was heard that the prison psychiatrist had not started Mike on antipsychotic medication. They had requested to see Mike two weeks after the first appointment, but it took over a month before a second appointment took place on 18 November. Anti-psychotic medication was then prescribed but Mike never received it. Expert psychiatrist Dr Maganty said in evidence that the initial decision not to prescribe antipsychotic medication was a serious failing and, had Mike received it, his death might not have occurred. Throughout Mike’s time in prison, his solicitors and family repeatedly informed the prison of their concerns about his health, after receiving concerning letters and Mike expressing plans of suicide during a visit. Mike’s risk level remained ‘low’ on the ACCT documents and it took weeks before the prison raised the observation levels from one per hour to two per hour. Despite this, prior to being found hanging, Mike went an hour without being checked on. The jury found that had Mike received adequate care, observations, support and medication it is more likely than not Mike’s life would have been prolonged. They concluded that neglect by the mental health team contributed to Mike’s death. The narrative verdict by the jury also identified the following: The risk of self-harm and suicide was inadequately communicated between healthcare and prison staff, and suicide and self-harm information was inadequately disseminated. Concerns raised by the family and Mike’s solicitor were inadequately acted upon, and there was ineffective recognition of Mike Forster's mental health deterioration by prison staff. There was a failure to apply the suicide and self-harm guidelines, with inadequate escalation of risk levels outline in guidance, and inappropriate management of ACCT procedures. The jury found that the decision not to prescribe anti-psychotic medication to Mike was inappropriate, and it was unreasonable for the mental health team to adopt a “wait and watch approach”.

Hostages: Sally Challen, Naweed Ali, Khobaib Hussain, Mohibur Rahman, Tahir Aziz, Roger Khan, Wang Yam, Andrew Malkinson, Michael Ross, Mark Alexander, Anis Sardar, Jamie Green, Dan Payne, Zoran Dresic, Scott Birtwistle, Jon Beere, Chedwyn Evans, Darren Waterhouse, David Norris, Brendan McConville, John Paul Wooton, John Keelan, Mohammed Niaz Khan, Abid Ashiq Hussain, Sharaz Yaqub, David Ferguson, Anthony Parsons, James Cullinene, Stephen Marsh, Graham Coutts, Royston Moore, Duane King, Leon Chapman, Tony Marshall, Anthony Jackson, David Kent, Norman Grant, Ricardo Morrison, Alex Silva,Terry Smith, Hyrone Hart, Glen Cameron,Warren Slaney, Melvyn 'Adie' McLellan, Lyndon Coles, Robert Bradley, John Twomey, Thomas G. Bourke, David E. Ferguson, Lee Mockble, George Coleman, Neil Hurley, Jaslyn Ricardo Smith, James Dowsett, Kevan & Miran Thakrar, Jordan Towers, Patrick Docherty, Brendan Dixon, Paul Bush, Alex Black, Nicholas Rose, Kevin Nunn, Peter Carine, Paul Higginson, Thomas Petch, Vincent and Sean Bradish, John Allen, Jeremy Bamber, Kevin Lane, Michael Brown, Robert Knapp, William Kenealy, Glyn Razzell, Willie Gage, Kate Keaveney, Michael Stone, Michael Attwooll, John Roden, Nick Tucker, Karl Watson, Terry Allen, Richard Southern, Jamil Chowdhary, Jake Mawhinney, Peter Hannigan.